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Abstract. Coherence is a key concept in many accounts of
epistemic justification within ‘traditional’ analytic epistemology.
Within formal epistemology, too, there is a substantial body
of research on coherence measures. However, there has been
surprisingly little interaction between the two bodies of literature.
The reason is that the existing formal literature on coherence
measure operates with a notion of belief system that is very
different from — what we argue is — a natural Bayesian
formalisation of the concept of belief system from traditional
epistemology. Therefore, formal epistemology has so far only been
concerned with one particular — arguably not even very natural —
way of formalising coherence of belief systems; it has by no means
refuted the viability of coherentism. In contrast to the existing
literature, we formalise belief systems as families of assignments
of (conditional) degrees of belief (which may be compatible with
several subjective probability measures).
Within this framework, we propose a Bayesian formalisation
of the thrust of BonJour’s coherence concept in The structure
of empirical knowledge (1985), using a combination of Bayesian
confirmation theory and basic graph theory. In excursions,
we introduce graded notions for both logical and probabilistic
consistency of belief systems — the latter being based on certain
geometrical structures induced by probabilistic belief systems.
For illustration, we reconsider BonJour’s “ravens” challenge
(op. cit., p. 95f.). Finally, potential objections to our proposed
formal coherence notion are explored.
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1. Introduction and motivation
Coherence is a key concept in ‘traditional’ (as opposed to formal)
analytic epistemology. There is a whole family of epistemological
positions (usually subsumed under the heading of ‘coherentism’)
according to which the coherence of a belief system plays a pivotal
rôle — sometimes even as a necessary and sufficient condition —
in determining whether an agent is epistemically justified in having
the belief system in question. In addition, even some moderate
foundationalists (Audi [5], for instance) would concede that coherence
increases — or constitutes even a necessary condition for — the
epistemic justifiability of a belief system.
Moreover, belief systems may be more or less coherent; that
coherence is a matter of degree has long been advocated, especially by
coherentists (cf. e.g. Brendel [12]). To be sure, formal epistemologists
have invested considerable energy into finding suitable measures of
coherence (cf. e.g. Shogenji [66] for a relatively early and well-known
proposal). Various authors have also shown that no coherence measure
can satisfy certain sets of desiderata (e.g. Klein and Warfield [43, 44]).
While there are arguably reasons to view some of those “impossibility
results” rather critically (cf. e.g. Meijs and Douven [52] and Schupbach
[65]), a large set of proposed coherence measures has just recently been
re-examined with respect to a new, arguably intuitive criterion — and
been found wanting (cf. Siebel and Wolff [67]).
It would therefore probably be fair to say that while the literature
on coherence measures is not unanimous in its disillusionment with
formal coherence notions, it does prima facie cast a shadow of doubt
on any epistemological theory that heavily depends on the notion of
coherence. In particular, this applies to coherentist theories of doxastic
or more generally epistemic justification.
The purpose of the present paper is to demonstrate that coherentist
theories of doxastic justification have not much to fear from the
literature on coherence measures because (1) coherence measures
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merely formalise a rather special notion of coherence of belief systems
to which coherentists are by no means committed and (2) a formal
definition of a Bayesian coherentist concept of coherence is feasible.
In order to show this, we will first (in Section 2) argue that (1)
the formal literature on coherence measures in general operates with
a concept of belief systems that is quite foreign to a straightforward
Bayesian formalisation of belief systems and is therefore concerned
with a rather peculiar coherence notion. In particular, the concept of
coherence investigated by the formal literature on coherence measures
cannot cover natural Bayesian formalisations of coherence concepts
from traditional epistemology.
On a more constructive note, we shall thereafter (2) propose a
natural formal (Bayesian) framework for the analysis of belief systems
(Section 3). In contrast to the existing literature on coherence
measures, we view belief systems not as sets of propositions, but as
families of assignments of (conditional) degrees of belief which may be
compatible with several subjective probability measures.
Within this framework, then, we shall outline a formalisation of
Laurence BonJour’s [6] coherence concept (Sections 4 and 5). At
the heart of this formalisation is a vector-valued (multi-dimensional)
coherence notion whose components are formalisations of each of
the first four of BonJour’s desiderata for a coherence notion. It is
plausible that the weight given to each of BonJour’s desiderata depends
on the epistemic context. Weighted averaging (perhaps corrected
by monotone transformations) in accordance with the respective
epistemic context yields a single-valued coherence measure. The multi-
dimensional coherence concept at the centre of this construction will
involve a notion of degree of confirmation from Bayesian confirmation
theory as well as a graph-theoretic notion of connectivity. In two
excursions, we introduce a graded notion of probabilistic consistency
of belief systems based on the geometrical structure of certain sets of
probability measures, as well as a graded notion of logical consistency
based on the parametric structure of the Lockean thesis (according to
which an individual has full belief in a proposition S if and only if he
holds partial belief in S with sufficiently high degree, say c 1/2).
We shall illustrate the formal machinery by means of two
benchmark examples of belief systems from the literature (Section 6):
Just as Bovens and Hartmann [9] did, we submit our proposed
coherence measure to the test of “BonJour’s challenge”. Several
potential objections to our proposal for a new graded coherence notion
are — along with possible refutations — explored in Section 7.
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2. Coherence measures vs. Bayesian formalisations of
traditional coherence concepts
For much more than a decade, formal epistemologists have directed
considerable efforts to finding formal, mathematical measures of —
what they viewed as — coherence.1 Several authors have also shown
that no coherence measure can satisfy certain sets of desiderata.2
Now, an (almost) ubiquitous feature of the formal literature
on coherence measures is that belief systems (information sets)
are conceived as collections of (binary assignments of truth values
to) propositions, rather than as assignments of degrees of belief
to (conditional) events. The literature on coherence measures
accommodates uncertainty only by allowing for varying degrees of
reliability in the sources of the propositions in the information
set (while assuming the information sources to be probabilistically
independent), but it does not allow for uncertainty at a more
fundamental level.3 Frequently, the information sets (sets of belief)
under consideration in the literature on coherence measures are
presented as sets of “witness reports”, which makes this kind of set-
up defensible for certain purposes.
As a representative example, consider the framework in the paper
by Moretti and Akiba [55], which is not only of substantial historical
interest, as it examines C.I. Lewis’ [49] view of coherence among others,
but also reviews several of the better-known coherence measures. The
framework of that paper presupposes an objectively given probability
measure Pr on some algebra A of propositions; a “set of beliefs” is a
subset of A, and a coherence measure is a function from a (subset of
the) power-set of A to the reals. For example, Shogenji’s [66] coherence
measure is defined (using the set-theoretic symbols for the Boolean
operations in A) as
CS ({B1, . . . , Bn}) = Pr (B1 ∩ · · · ∩Bn)
Pr (B1)× · · · × Pr (Bn)
1For some well-known papers, cf. e.g. Shogenji [66], Akiba [1] and Fitelson [25]
— as well as Dietrich and Moretti [19] for a systematic comparison.
2Cf. e.g. Klein and Warfield [43, 44], Bovens and Hartmann [8, 10, 11] and
Olsson [56, 57, 58]; for a critical assessment of those “impossibility results”, cf.
Meijs and Douven [52] and Schupbach [65]. That coherence measures generally
fail to satisfy a rather intuitive criterion has also been demonstrated by Siebel and
Wolff [67].
3Douven and Meijs [22] represent an exception to this rule. They propose
a quantitative theory of coherence in the framework of a quantitative bootstrap
confirmation theory à la Glymour [29]. But in this setting, the theories to be
confirmed consist of propositions given some prior. Therefore, even the theories in
Douven and Meijs’ [22] paper are not belief systems as Bayesians would normally
understand them.
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for all B1, . . . , Bn ∈ A (or, in more economic notation, CS(E) =
Pr (
⋂
E) /
∏
B∈E Pr(B) for all E ⊆ A; this definition allows for
coherence to be defined for infinite “sets of beliefs”, too).
In contrast to such a view of “sets of beliefs”, belief systems as
Bayesians understand them in other contexts are systems of conditional
probability assignments — corresponding to conditional degrees of
belief —, not propositions or binary assignments of truth values to
propositions. For a Bayesian, a belief system is generally encoded by
a probability measure — or, more generally, by a (possibly singleton)
set of probability measures.
We will present a formal framework for an analysis of such belief
systems from a Bayesian perspective shortly. At this point, we merely
conclude that the existing literature on coherence measures has not
addressed the problem of measuring the coherence of belief systems
when understood in Bayesian terms.4 Even though one of the earliest
papers on coherence measures (Klein andWarfield [43]) explicitly refers
to BonJour’s coherentist treatise [6] (as do Bovens and Hartmann [9]),
the literature on coherence measures provides by no means a definitive
answer about the prospects of coherentism, because it operates within
a framework that is arguably not the most natural one.
The aim of the remainder of the paper is now to develop a graded
coherence notion for belief systems conceived as sets of conditional
probability assignments — in a way that is both mathematically
rigorous and takes into account the insights of traditional, non-
formal epistemology. More technically speaking, we shall formalise
BonJour’s [6] coherence concept by showing how to view a belief system
(thus understood) as a Bayesian network which induces a geometrical
structure on the set of probability measures compatible with the belief
system in question. Depending on the epistemic context, some of
the desiderata may be more important than others (perhaps even
in a non-linear manner), for constituting doxastic justification. In
order to arrive at a single-valued coherence measure that respects the
respective epistemic context, one can form the weighted average of
the components of this vector-valued coherence measure (perhaps after
applying monotone transformations that remove non-linearities). The
result will satisfy all of BonJour’s desiderata.5
4One may wonder where such an understanding of sets of beliefs is coming
from. However, unless one is a Bayesian, it is very natural to identify beliefs with
propositions and thus belief sets with sets of propositions. Moreover, as Hansson
and Olsson [32] have pointed out, there is a long-standing association of the AGM
theory of belief revision due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [2] with
coherentism.
5Note that the expression “in proportion” in BonJour’s desiderata (II) and (V)
need not be understood in a literal manner (as if it required linear dependence).
Otherwise, BonJour would have presupposed that coherence-salient qualities of a
doxastic system such as the “degree of probabilistic consistency” or the “presence
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3. A formal Bayesian framework for belief systems
Our formal framework is motivated as follows. We consider an
epistemic agent who has to choose one among several competing, in
general rather large, belief systems (for instance, entire worldviews).
One of the criteria she employs in the choice of a belief system will be
relative coherence (ultimately to be defined in Section 5).
We make the ‘structural’ assumption that all of her candidate belief
systems are sets of conditional degrees of belief, and that the pairs of
propositions to which the belief systems assign conditional degrees of
belief are pairs of propositions from the same algebra. Furthermore,
we adopt the thesis of probabilism by assuming that these conditional
degrees of belief correspond to conditional probability assignments.6
Thus, we essentially subscribe to the assumption that the epistemic
agent assigns to any conditional event either a precise degree of belief
or none at all.7 (A similar construal of belief systems can already be
found in Carnap [13].)
Of course, this is a somewhat stylised formal framework.
Nevertheless, we have chosen it in order to convey the main idea of our
proposed graded coherence notion. In principle, it could be replaced
by a more comprehensive set-up — e.g. one that allows for imprecise
or interval probabilities8 at a fuller scale.
The natural formal description of our stylised framework is of a
simple Bayesian kind. While our interpretation of the framework
is broadly subjective internalist, the framework itself and the
development of the formal coherence notion are independent of that
interpretation. (Our subjective internalist interpretation may be read
as a mere manner of speaking rather than as the expression of an actual
philosophical claim.)
In order to introduce the details of the formal framework, we fix
some algebra A of propositions. (In the realm of interpretation, this
should be chosen in such a way as to consist of all propositions about
of unexplained anomalies in the believed content of the system” admit a canonical
quantification with values in a vector space.
6There is, of course, an ongoing discussion in formal epistemology about how
to optimally defend probabilism, cf. e.g. Joyce [39], Easwaran and Fitelson [23],
Fitelson and McCarthy [26], Leitgeb and Pettigrew [47, 48], Wedgwood [71];
reviewing this discussion is, however, not within the scope of this paper.
7We write “essentially” because even this framework will under some conditions
entail the assignment of interval probabilities to certain propositions/events: The
monotonicity of probability measures always implies P (B|C) ≥ α for all α,A,B,C
with P (A|C) = α and A ⊆ B. Therefore, whenever B belongs to the algebra
generated by the propositions featuring in S and both 〈A|C‖α〉 ∈ S and A ⊆ B
holds, then one will have P (B|C) ≥ α for all P compatible with the belief system
S. In other words, any probability measure P compatible with S will assign a
probability ≥ α to the conditional event B-given-C.
8In the sense of Walley [69, 70] or Weichselberger [72].
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which our epistemic agent might possibly form conditional beliefs.) A
belief system S will now be a set of conditional probability assignments,
interpreted as conditional degrees of belief, to pairs of propositions
(i.e., pairs of elements of A): We define a belief system to be a set of
triples, by convention denoted 〈A|B‖α〉, where A,B ∈ A and α is a
real number between 0 and 1. The expression 〈A|B‖α〉 is to be read as:
“Given B, the belief system assigns to A a conditional degree of belief of
α.” While our epistemological interpretation (via conditional degrees
of belief) provides the main reason for taking conditional probability
assignments as primitive, it is worthwhile to note that Rényi [62] (and
to some extent also de Finetti [16]) actually developed foundations
for probability theory with conditional probability functions as the
fundamental objects.
Note once again that belief systems, in our terminology, are not just
sets of propositions — unlike, for example, in the AGM belief-revision
literature [2]. Rather, they are systems of conditional degree-of-belief
assignments to propositions from a given algebra. In particular, belief
systems are not assumed to satisfy logical completeness of any kind.
A probability measure P : A → [0, 1] is said to be compatible
with a belief system9 S if and only if P (A|B) = α holds for all
triples 〈A|B‖α〉 ∈ S. A belief system S is said to be probabilistically
consistent10 if and only if there exists a probability measure compatible
with S.
The set of all probability measures on A that are compatible with
a given belief system S will be denoted PS. Thus, a belief system is
probabilistically consistent if and only if PS is non-empty. In addition
to this notion of probabilistic consistency simpliciter, we will later on
introduce a graded notion of probabilistic consistency. This notion
will be conceived ‘semantically’ — in the sense that the degree of
probabilistic consistency of a belief system S will be measured in terms
of the size of the ‘extension’ PS of the belief system.
4. BonJour’s coherence notion
Having formalised the notions of belief sytems and probabilistic
consistency simpliciter (of belief systems), let us now consider an
agent who has to choose between two belief systems S1, S2. According
to coherentists and moderate foundationalists (e.g., Audi [5]), the
coherence of the belief systems should be a — for some, even the —
decisive factor in determining which belief system to adopt. (Holistic
coherentists would demand that only ‘comprehensive’ belief systems
be taken under consideration — belief systems which, in particular,
9Another possible name for the compatible-with relation would be “support”, cf.
Herzberg [38]. This term, however, is already defined in measure theory, whence we
shall not use it in the sense of the compatible-with relation lest we create confusion.
10This is what de Finetti [15, 16, 17] already calls coherence.
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encode all information that is available to the agent and, moreover,
assign degrees of belief to all conditional events whose probability will
be involved in the agent’s decisions. By this means, standard objections
such as the isolation objection lose their force and coherence arguably
does becomes the single decisive factor.) This calls for the definition of
a graded notion of coherence.
We aim at a definition or explication that (1) is in formal,
mathematical terms, and (2) at the same takes into account insights
from traditional, i.e. as opposed to formal, epistemology. Among
contemporary philosophers, BonJour [6] and Lehrer [45] have been
perhaps the two foremost defenders of coherentism in traditional
epistemology. BonJour also offers a sketch of a graded coherence
notion, which is sufficiently detailed to become the point of departure
for a formal reconstruction. He suggests the following “reasonable
outline of the concept of coherence” [6, p. 94]:
[(I)] A system of beliefs is coherent only if it is
logically consistent.
[(II)] A system of beliefs is coherent in proportion to
its degree of probabilistic consistency.
[. . . ]
[(III)] The coherence of a system of beliefs is increased
by the presence of inferential connections
between its component beliefs and increased in
proportion to the number and strength of such
connections.
[(IV)] The coherence of a system of beliefs is
diminished to the extent to which it is divided
into subsystems of beliefs which are relatively
unconnected to each other by inferential
connections.
[. . . ]
[(V)] The coherence of a system of beliefs is decreased
in proportion to the presence of unexplained
anomalies in the believed content of the system.
[6, Section 5.3, pp. 95, 98, 99]
Our task will now be first of all to find explications, in our formal
framework, of these five requirements. Depending on the epistemic
context, one can then monotonically transform them and form their
weighted average, in order to arrive at a context-specific single-valued
coherence measure.
5. A formalisation of BonJour’s coherence concept
For the subsequent formalisation of BonJour’s graded notion of
coherence, we shall first assume, for simplicity, that A is actually a
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finite algebra. Moreover, since any such algebra is isomorphic to a
(finite) power-set algebra11, we may assume that A = 2Ω. Following
common practise in probability theory, one may view Ω as a set of
possible worlds, so that any algebra element A ∈ A can be understood
at the same time as a proposition and as an event, i.e. the extension of a
proposition (viz. the set of worlds in which the proposition holds true).
The propositional constants >,⊥ of truth and falsity correspond to the
maximal and minimal elements of the power-set algebra, viz. Ω and ∅,
respectively — and the Boolean operations of ∧,∨,¬ correspond to the
set-theoretic operations ∩,∪, {.
In the first and most difficult step, we shall define functions that
attempt to quantify each of BonJour’s desiderata. The result will be
a vector-valued coherence measure with components β1, . . . , β4. Later
on, we will briefly address the question of turning this vector-valued
coherence measure into a single-valued one.
5.1. Formalising BonJour’s first desideratum. The first
requirement (I) presupposes an underlying theory of the relation of
(full) beliefs and degrees of belief, which is still the subject of an ongoing
intense debate in formal epistemology — to which, among others,
Arló-Costa and Parikh [3], Foley [27], Leitgeb [46], Arló-Costa and
Pedersen [4] have contributed. The most well-known bridge principle
is the Lockean thesis, which says that full belief is (partial) belief to a
sufficiently high degree (c, say).12
A straightforward interpretation of BonJour’s requirement (I)
would be to say that a belief system is logically consistent if the set of
those elements of A (propositions/events) to which an unconditional
degree of belief > c is assigned by all probability measures compatible
with the belief system in question, should not be a logical absurdity —
i.e., such a system should have a non-empty intersection. This notion
is problematic because it hinges on the somewhat arbitrary choice of
the parameter c.
A very strong version of requirement (I) which circumvents this
problem of parameter dependence would be to demand for logical
consistency that the intersection of all those propositions/events to
which an unconditional degree of belief > 1
2
is assigned by all
probability measures which are compatible with the belief system
should be non-empty. In other words, a very strong parameter-
independent version of (I) requires:
(1) η (S, (1/2, 1]) 6= ∅,
wherein η(S, I), for all I ⊆ [0, 1], denotes the intersection of all
propositions/events to which a probability within I is assigned by all
11Cf. e.g. the classical paper by Stone [68, Theorem 12].
12Statements that can be interpreted as expressing or at least supporting this
thesis occur repeatedly in Locke’s Essay [50, Book IV, Chapters XIV–XVII].
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probability measures compatible with S:
η(S, I) :=
⋂⋂{
P−1 (I) : P ∈ PS
}
=
⋂
A∈A
∀P∈PS P (A)∈I
A.
An extremely weak, yet also parameter-independent reading of
requirement (I) would only demand for logical consistency that
the intersection of all those propositions/events to which an
(unconditional) degree of belief = 1 is assigned by all probability
measures which are compatible with the belief system should be non-
empty, in symbols:
(2) η (S, {1}) 6= ∅.
Both requirements expressed in formulae (1) and (2) take an all-
or-nothing approach to logical consistency. This is perfectly in
line with BonJour’s [6] position who viewed logical consistency as
a binary concept (see, for example, the comparison of logical and
probabilistic consistency quoted below [6, p. 95]). Logical consistency
is a binary component of the multi-faceted non-binary, graded concept
of coherence.
Now, the strong requirement in formulae (1) seems problematic
because on such an interpretation of logical consistency and coherence,
the paradoxes of the preface (cf. Makinson [51] and Pollock [59])
or the lottery (cf. e.g. Christensen [14]) would show that rational
human beings rather frequently hold utterly incoherent belief systems.
Therefore, we propose to formalise logical consistency through the weak
requirement in formula (2):
β1(S) =
{
1, η (S, {1}) 6= ∅
0, η (S, {1}) = ∅.
5.2. Excursion: A graded notion of logical consistency for
probabilistic belief systems. Even though this will not enter our
formal coherence measure, it is certainly worthwhile to ask if there is
a natural graded notion of logical consistency for probabilistic belief
systems. And indeed, in view of the parametric nature of the Lockean
thesis, there is a candidate for such a concept: One could measure
logical consistency through the reciprocal value of the infimal (roughly:
minimal) c such that the intersection of all those propositions/events
to which an (unconditional) degree of belief > c is assigned by all
probability measures which are compatible with the belief system
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becomes non-empty:13
β˜1(S) := 1/ inf {c ∈ [0, 1] : η (S, (c, 1]) 6= ∅}
(with the usual conventions:14 inf ∅ = ∞, 1/∞ = 0, 1/0 = ∞). We
have mentioned this possibility of defining a graded notion of logical
consistency only for the sake of completeness. However, it is no longer a
formalisation of BonJour’s first desideratum and we do not suggest that
it should be part of a formal coherence concept. The first component
of our proposed coherence measure is binary, as will be the second.
5.3. Formalising BonJour’s second desideratum. A naïve
reading of BonJour’s requirement (II) would look for a measure for
the degree of probabilistic consistency of a belief system in our above
formal framework. However, if one reads this requirement in context,
one finds the following paragraph:
Probabilistic consistency differs from straightforward
logical consistency in two important respects. First, it
is extremely doubtful that probabilistic inconsistency
can be entirely avoided. Improbable things do, after
all, sometimes happen, and sometimes one can avoid
admitting them only by creating an even greater
probabilistic inconsistency at another point. Second,
probabilistic consistency, unlike logical consistency, is
13One might perhaps wonder whether β˜1(S) equals the somewhat simpler
expression
β¯1(S) := 1/ inf
c ∈ [0, 1] : ∃ω ∈ Ω
⋂
A∈A
∀P∈PS P (A)>c
A = {ω}
 .
To be sure,c ∈ [0, 1] : ∃ω ∈ Ω
⋂
A∈A
∀P∈PS P (A)>c
A = {ω}
 ⊆
c ∈ [0, 1] :
⋂
A∈A
∀P∈PS P (A)>c
A 6= ∅
 ,
so the infimum of the former set is greater or equal than that of
the latter. The converse estimate, however, need not hold: For, it
may happen that
⋂
A∈A
∀P∈PS P (A)>c
A = {ω1, . . . , ωm} with pairwise distinct
ω1, . . . , ωm while P{ω1} = P{ωi} for all P ∈ PS and i ≤ m. Then,
for any c′ < c for which ω1 6∈
⋂ {A ∈ A : ∀P ∈ PS P (A) > c′}, one
also has ωi 6∈
⋂ {A ∈ A : ∀P ∈ PS P (A) > c′} for all other i ≤ m,
all the while
⋂ {A ∈ A : ∀P ∈ PS P (A) > c′} ⊆ {ω1, . . . , ωm} and thus⋂ {A ∈ A : ∀P ∈ PS P (A) > c′} = ∅. For example, if S is the belief system of
ignorance, i.e. PS is the singleton consisting of the uniform distribution on a finite
set Ω of states of the world, then 0 = β¯1(S) < β˜1(S) = 1.
14In very liberal belief systems — viz. those that are compatible with several
extreme probability measures that assign probability zero to different states of the
world — it may happen that η (S, {1}) = ∅ and therefore a fortiori η (S, (c, 1]) = ∅
for all c, which entails β1(S) = 0.
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plainly a matter of degree, depending on (a) just how
many conflicts the system contains and (b) the degree
of improbability involved in each case. [6, p. 95]
From a Bayesian perspective, this reasoning seems surprising, to say the
least. That events which were a priori (before carrying out) unlikely do
sometimes happen and therefore can enter a belief system a posteriori
does not at all constitute probabilistic inconsistency, because the small
probability was assigned by the prior probability measure, and the high
probability was assigned by the posterior probability. For BonJour, this
solution is not available because he identifies belief with full belief.
For us, however, there is no reason to copy this view of probabilistic
(in)consistency, because in our Bayesian framework, probabilistic
consistency is already defined in a very natural way — even though
as a binary concept:
β2(S) =
{
1, PS 6= ∅
0, PS = ∅.
That said, it is still interesting to ask if there exists a sense in which
probabilistic consistency could be a matter of degree.
5.4. Excursion: A graded notion of probabilistic
consistency for probabilistic belief systems. For the construal
of a graded notion of probabilistic consistency, we adopt a semantic
understanding of ‘consistency’. Then, it is most natural to measure
the degree of probabilistic consistency of a belief system S in terms
of the “size” of the set PS of probability measures compatible with S.
While this set will not be finite in general, it is not difficult to realise
that the set PS possesses a distinctive geometrical structure — at least
if the algebra A is finite.
In order to see this, suppose that A is finite, so that it can be
identified with the power-set algebra of a finite set, Ω, say. Then,
on the one hand, the set of probability measures with domain 2Ω
can be geometrically represented by the intersection of a hyperplane
(consisting of all vectors whose components add up to one) and the unit
cube of dimension card(Ω): One can canonically — up to permutations
of the coordinates — embed the set ∆ of all probability measures
defined on A into Rcard(Ω) by some map ι; ι[∆] will then be the subset
of those card(Ω)-tuples of real numbers whose entries are all between
0 and 1 and sum up to one.
Furthermore, under such a representation, the set P{〈A|B‖α〉} is
just the intersection of two hyperplanes with the unit cube: If,
say, Ω =
{
ω(1), . . . , ω(N)
}
, A =
{
ω(k(1)), . . . , ω(k(m))
}
and B ={
ω(`(1)), . . . , ω(`(n))
}
for k : {1, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . , N} and ` :
{1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , N}, then P{〈A|B‖α〉}, the set of probability
measures satisfying P (A ∩ B) = αP (B), can be represented by the
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set
ι
[
P{〈A|B‖α〉}
]
=
x ∈ [0, 1]N :
x(1) + · · ·+ x(N) = 1,∑
i∈k[{1,...,m}]∩`[{1,...,n}] x
(i)
= α
∑n
j=1 x
(`(j))
 .
On the other hand, by definition,
PS =
⋂
A,B∈A,α∈[0,1]
〈A|B‖α〉S
P{〈A|B‖α〉}.
It follows that ι[PS] itself is just the intersection of the unit cube
(of dimension log2 card(A)) with several hyperplanes. In other
words, for finite algebras A one can always represent the set of all
probability measures that are compatible with a given belief system by
a geometrically very well-behaved set, viz. the intersection of a unit
cube with finitely many hyperplanes.
This is significant because there is a canonical way of measuring
the “size” of such a set, viz. the pair consisting of the Hausdorff
dimension and the Hausdorff measure [33]. Since ι[PS] is a very
natural parametric representation of PS (in a sense canonical, up to
permutation of coordinates — which leaves the Hausdorff measure
and Hausdorff dimension unchanged), we have ultimately even found
a canonical way of measuring the “size” of PS itself.
Thus, one can measure the size of PS — and hence the probabilistic
consistency of the belief system S — by the pair consisting of the
Hausdorff dimension of the canonical image of PS under ι and its
Hausdorff measure:
β˜2(S) :=
〈
D (ι[PS]) ,H
D(ι[PS]) (ι[PS])
〉
,
where PS is greater than PS′ if and only if either (i) D (ι[PS]) >
D (ι[PS′ ]) or (ii) D (ι[PS]) = D (ι[PS′ ]), but HD(ι[PS]) (ι[PS]) >
HD(ι[PS′ ]) (ι[PS′ ]).15
Of course, the choice of ι was only canonical up to permutation of
the coordinates. However, permuting the coordinates does not affect
the Hausdorff measure, let alone the Hausdorff dimension, in any way.
Therefore, there is a profound sense in which the pair consisting of the
Hausdorff dimension and Hausdorff measure of ι[PS] is a natural, if not
canonical way of measuring the size of PS — and hence, on a semantic
understanding of probabilistic consistency, the degree of probabilistic
consistency of S.
However, while it is possible to define a graded measure of
probabilistic consistency, it is much less clear what the relation of the
graded notion of probabilistic consistency to coherence is: If a belief
15In other words, if the values of β˜2 are used to measure probabilistic
consistency, they should to be read in lexicographic order, so that the first
component of β˜2 always trumps the second one.
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system is so acute that only a single probability measure is compatible
with it, should we view this as a token for coherence — or rather for
incoherence, because it borders probabilistic inconsistency by a knife’s
edge? Our intuitions seem to point in both directions at once, perhaps
with a greater weight on the latter (incoherence). However, all that
this shows is that the relation of graded probabilistic consistency and
coherence is not yet sufficiently understood to warrant the inclusion
of graded probabilistic consistency into our vector-valued coherence
measure.
Therefore, we stick with the above definition of β2 derived from
the binary notion of probabilistic consistency. We do not propose
the graded notion of probabilistic consistency described above, despite
being of interest in its own right, to enter the graded coherence notion
defined in this paper.
5.5. Formalising BonJour’s third and fourth desiderata.
For BonJour’s third and fourth requirements, we suggest viewing a
belief system S as a directed graph,16 such that the vertices (nodes)
are propositions to which any agent with belief system S assigns a
sufficiently high degree of belief and such that an arrow from B to A
means that B confirms A (in the sense of Bayesian confirmation theory)
with respect to the belief system S.
On the one hand, such a representation of belief systems would
neatly formalise coherentist intuitions such as Quine’s and Ullian’s “web
of belief” [61]. On the other hand, it is plagued by the invocation
of the concept of belief simpliciter (the vertices are supposed to be
propositions which the agent believes tout court) within a framework
among whose basic concepts is that of a degree of belief.
We propose to solve this by means of a set of directed graphs. First,
there is what we shall extended web of belief HS. Here, the vertices are
all those propositions A ∈ A that are at least candidates for objects of
full belief in the sense that P (A) > 1/2 for all P ∈ PS. There will be
an arrow between vertex B and vertex A if and only if B confirms A in
the sense of Bayesian confirmation theory (with the belief system S in
the background), i.e. if and only if P (A|B)− P (A) > 0 for all P ∈ PS.
The extended web of belief contains propositions as vertices to which
not a precise probability, but merely a lower bound is assigned by the
belief system (e.g. all events/propositions that extensionally dominate
an event/proposition to which S unconditionally assigns some precise
probability > 1/2, cf. footnote 7).
Then there is the inner web of belief GS. Here, the vertices are all
those propositions A ∈ A which might be verified to be objects of full
belief for suitable thresholds c in the Lockean thesis. More precisely,
the vertices of GS are all those propositions A ∈ A to which precise
16The graph-theoretic terminology is taken from Diestel [18].
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unconditional probabilities > 1/2 are assigned by the belief system, in
the sense that there is a real number α > 1/2 such that P (A) = α for
all P ∈ PS. There will be an arrow between vertex B and vertex A if
and only if B confirms A in the sense of Bayesian confirmation theory
(with the belief system S in the background) with a precise degree of
confirmation, i.e. if and only if there exists some real number γ > 0
such that P (A|B) − P (A) = γ for all P ∈ PS. For any such A,B, we
shall refer to this positive real γ as γ(B,A). For those B,A, for which
there is no γ > 0 that would satisfy P (A|B)−P (A) = γ for all P ∈ PS
exists, we simply put γ(B,A) = 0.
In addition, one could define, for any c ≥ 1/2, the c-core of beliefs
as the subgraph GcS of GS which consists of only those propositions A
to which precise unconditional probabilities > c are assigned by the
belief system, in the sense that there is a real number α > c such that
P (A) = α for all P ∈ PS. For all c ≥ 1/2, GcS as well as GS and HS are
Bayesian networks.
Now there are two aspects to BonJour’s requirement (III), the first
being that “[t]he coherence of a system of beliefs is increased by the
presence of inferential connections between its component beliefs and
increased in proportion to the number [. . . ] of such connections”.
We suggest capturing this by the graph-theoretic notion of (vertex)
connectivity κ. In light of the adaptation of Menger’s theorem [53] (cf.
also Whitney [73] and Kőnig [42]) to directed graphs (cf. Gallai [30]
and Dirac [20, 21]), this notion can even be defined in two equivalent
natural ways, one of them being that the connectivity κ(G) of a graph
G equals k if and only if for any two vertices A,B, there are at least k
independent paths from A to B,17 but there are also two vertices A′, B′
such that one cannot find k + 1 independent paths from A′ to B′.
The second of the two aspects of BonJour’s requirement (III)
demands that “[t]he coherence of a system of beliefs is increased [. . . ] in
proportion to the [. . . ] strength of [inferential] connections [between its
component beliefs]”. Of course, in a Bayesian setting, the most natural
interpretation of the “strength of an inferential connection” from B
to A is the degree by which B confirms A (in the sense of Bayesian
confirmation theory). While there are several quantitative measures
for the degree of confirmation in Bayesian confirmation theory, the
(by far) most widely-used among them is the relevance measure, also
known as the difference measure of confirmation, which defines the
degree by which B confirms A as P (A|B) − P (A). Another, more
direct, motivation for using the relevance measure to assess coherence
is the following: If a set of beliefs really coheres (hangs together well), it
should be possible to repair local loss of information. Thus, there will in
general be multiple pieces of confirmatory evidence for assigning a high
17A collection of paths is independent if and only if none of the paths in that
collection contains an inner vertex of another path from that collection.
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degree of belief in a certain proposition, and even in the absence of one
of those pieces of evidence, there will be other pieces of confirmatory
evidence which warrant the assignment of a lower, but still considerable
degree of belief to that proposition.
Thus, we propose to measure the number and strength of initial
connections in the belief system by vertex connectivity and the vector
of positive relevance values:
β3(S) := 〈κ(GS), 〈γ(B,A) : A,B ∈ A〉〉 .
The penultimate requirement of BonJour’s is (IV), which demands
that the relative fragmentation of a belief system (given the overall level
of connectivity within the belief system) diminish coherence. This can
be accommodated by defining β4(S) to be (i) the reciprocal cardinality
of the set of maximal κ(GS) + 1-connected proper subgraphs, i.e.
κ(GS) + 1-components, if this set is non-empty and (ii) zero otherwise.
For example, in the special case when κ(GS) = 0 (i.e. GS is totally
disconnected), we have β4(S) = 0.
5.6. BonJour’s fifth desideratum. It is not nearly as clear
how to formalise the fifth and last requirement — i.e. the negative
“influence of unexplained anomalies” on the degree of coherence —
be it in our formal framework or in another. That said, BonJour
considered (V) to be only an “advisable” [6, p. 99] and thus perhaps not
mandatory ingredient of a coherence theory of epistemic justification.
At least for the first four (essential) criteria, we have proposed rigorous
formalisations.
5.7. Taking stock of the formalisation. Generalisation to
infinite belief systems. In sum, we have proposed a vector-valued
measure of coherence γ, which assigns to a belief system S the vector
γ(S) = 〈β1(S), β2(S), β3(S), β4(S)〉 ,
with β1, β2, β3, β4 defined as above, and thus formalises what may be
called the thrust of BonJour’s coherence concept.
Note that this definition of a vector-valued coherence measure only
applies, as it stands, to finite belief systems, whilst coherentists are
generally committed to a holistic approach that takes into account
the whole worldview of an agent, which may well be an infinite belief
system. In order to obtain a vector-valued coherence measure which
is defined for some infinite belief systems, one can simply resort to
Robinsonian [63, 64] nonstandard analysis: By the transfer principle
of nonstandard analysis, our vector-valued coherence measure will
then not only be defined for all finite belief systems, but even for all
hyperfinite belief systems.
However, it can be shown (cf. Fajardo and Keisler [24]) that
hyperfinite probability spaces are universal and saturated in a rigorous
model-theoretic sense (based on a model theory of random variables
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and stochastic processes). Therefore, we may without loss of generality
assume that any infinite belief system has been defined on a hyperfinite
probability space from the start. The range of the coherence measure
will then be a set of vectors of hyperreals — but nothing in the concept
of coherence measure requires its range to consist of reals or tuples of
reals only.
6. Examples. BonJour’s challenge
6.1. Preparations for the formalisation of BonJour’s
challenge. We shall now illustrate our coherence definition by means
of some examples. First, let us recall BonJour’s [6, p. 96] challenge,
which has been neatly summarised by Bovens and Hartmann [9, p. 618].
Consider the following propositions:
R˜1: ‘All ravens are black.’
R2: ‘This bird is a raven.’
R3: ‘This bird is black.’
R′1: ‘This chair is brown.’
R′2: ‘Electrons are negatively charged.’
R′3: ‘Today is Thursday.’
Let R˜ =
{
R˜1, R2, R3
}
and R′ = {R′1, R′2, R′3}. In Bovens’ and
Hartmann’s words, “The challenge is to give an account of the fact
that [R˜] is more coherent than [R′].” [9, p. 618]
Of course, it is tacitly assumed herein that among R′1, R′2, R′3,
no inferential connections are known (to the individual who holds
this belief system). The belief systems that are (in approximation)
represented by the information sets R and R′ should be understood
to embody no inferential connections except for the obvious one, viz.
modus ponens inference from R1, R2 to R3.
Moreover, in contrast to the other propositions in R˜ ∪ R′, the
proposition R˜1 can be regarded as a scheme of inferential connections
rather than as a proposition (and therefore has been typographically
set apart). In the context of the belief system represented by R˜, it
could also be replaced by a mere single inferential connection such as:
R3|R2: ‘If this bird is a raven, then it is black.’
Indeed, if one wants to take a thoroughly Bayesian approach to belief
systems, the most natural way forward is to formalise belief systems
as Bayesian networks, as we have done in the preceding sections.
However, incorporating a scheme of inferential connections into a
Bayesian network amounts to incorporating each of the instantiations
as inferential connections into the Bayesian network. In the context
of our example, the scheme R˜1 only implies one such inferential
connection, viz. R3|R2.
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We shall henceforth study R := {R3|R2, R2, R3} en lieu of R˜.
BonJour’s challenge is then to give an account of the greater coherence
of R compared to that of R′.
6.2. Formalising the belief systems involved in BonJour’s
challenge. In order to meet that challenge by applying the formal
analysis of the preceding sections, we first need to translate R and
R′ into belief systems S, S′ as we (from our rigorously Bayesian
perspective) understand them.
In our setting, if the information available to a rational individual
is — in approximation — represented by R (or R′, respectively), this
means something like:
(1) she assigns to each of the propositions/events and conditional
events in R (or R′, respectively) a sufficiently high degree of
belief;
(2) all degrees of belief that she assigns to other conditional events
assume pairwise independence of the propositions constituting
the conditional event in question.
The first step is the choice of an algebra of propositions/events to
which conditional degrees of belief will be assigned. Since there are
only finitely many propositions involved, we may model each situation
on the basis of a finite algebra A or A′—which, in turn we may identify
with power-set algebras 2Ω and 2Ω′ , respectively. Applied to our choices
of R and R′, the above translation program yields the following.
• An individual with information set R has a belief system S
consisting of:
– 〈Ri|Ω‖αi〉 for each i ∈ {2, 3} for some αi ∈ [0, 1] that is
sufficiently close to 1;
– 〈R3|R2‖α1〉 for some α1 ∈ [0, 1] that is sufficiently close
to 1 and strictly greater than α3.
Therefore, for the belief system S, the set Ω of states of the
world only needs four elements, given by the state descriptions
‘R2 and R3’, ‘R2 but not R3’, ‘R3 but not R3’, ‘neither R2 not
R3’. More formally, let us define the states of the world as
follows:
ω(1) :=
〈
R˙2, R˙3
〉
ω(2) :=
〈
R˙2, ¬˙R˙3
〉
ω(3) :=
〈
¬˙R˙2, R˙3
〉
ω(4) :=
〈
¬˙R˙2, ¬˙R˙3
〉
.
(Herein, ¬ denotes propositional negation, and the dots
indicate that R˙i is a mere name for the proposition Ri, but not
the proposition itself — which, when identified with extension,
is a set of states of the world!)
• An individual with information set R′ has a belief system S′
consisting of:
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– 〈R′1|Ω′‖α′1〉, 〈R′1|R′2‖α′1〉, 〈R′1|R′3‖α′1〉 for some α′1 ∈ [0, 1];
– 〈R′2|Ω′‖α′2〉, 〈R′2|R′1‖α′2〉, 〈R′2|R′3‖α′2〉 for some α′2 ∈ [0, 1];
– 〈R′3|Ω′‖α′3〉, 〈R′3|R′1‖α′3〉, 〈R′3|R′2‖α′3〉 for some α′3 ∈ [0, 1],
wherein for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, α′i is sufficiently close to 1.
Therefore, for the belief system S′, the set Ω′ of states of the
world only needs eight elements:
ω′(1) :=
〈
R˙′1, R˙
′
2, R˙
′
3
〉
ω′(2) :=
〈
R˙′1, R˙
′
2, ¬˙R˙′3
〉
ω′(3) :=
〈
R˙′1, ¬˙R˙′2, R˙′3
〉
ω′(4) :=
〈
R˙′1, ¬˙R˙′2, ¬˙R˙′3
〉
ω′(5) :=
〈
¬˙R˙′1, R˙′2, R˙′3
〉
ω′(6) :=
〈
¬˙R˙′1, R˙′2, ¬˙R˙′3
〉
ω′(7) :=
〈
¬˙R˙′1, ¬˙R˙′2, R˙′3
〉
ω′(8) :=
〈
¬˙R˙′1, ¬˙R˙′2, ¬˙R˙′3
〉
We now need to compute — or at least estimate — the several
components β1, β2, β3, β4 of our coherence measure applied to S and S′.
We need to show that according to our multi-dimensional coherence
measure, the coherence of S dominates that of S′ — except perhaps in
extraordinary circumstances.
For the application of our coherence measure (in particular for
β3, β4), we need to represent S and S′ as Bayesian networks. The belief
system S′ is represented by a completely disconnected graph GS′ with
three vertices, so that
β3(S
′) = 〈0, 〈0, . . . , 0〉〉 , β4(S′) = 0.
The belief system S consists of two vertices with an arrow from R2
(‘This bird is a raven’) to R3 (‘This bird is black’).
We shall now calculates β1, β2, β3, β4 for S and S′; we shall also
estimate β˜2 for both belief systems. For reasons of economy of
presentation, we start with β3, β4.
6.3. Calculation of the third and fourth component of the
coherence measure. Given the above descriptions of the Bayesian
networks GS, GS′ associated to the belief systems S, S′, the (vertex)
connectivity of GS is 1, the single inferential non-zero connection in GS
being the one from R2 to R3, whose strength is γ(R2, R3) = α1−α3 > 0.
In contrast, the (vertex) connectivity of GS′ is 0, and thus the
vector of strengths of inferential connections among the vertices in GS′
is trivial (consists of zeroes only). Thus,
β3(S) =
〈
1,
〈
α1 − α3︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
, 0, . . . , 0
〉〉
.
β3(S
′) = 〈0, 〈0, . . . , 0〉〉 .
The relative fragmentation of both S and S′ is zero: GS has
connectivity 1, but no 2-connected components; GS′ has connectivity
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0 (is totally disconnected) and therefore cannot have any 1-connected
components. Thus,
β4(S) = 0 = β4(S
′).
6.4. Calculation of graded probabilistic consistency. The
second component of the coherence measure. We shall calculate
β˜2 for S, S′; as a by-product, this will yield probabilistic consistency
proofs for both S and S′. Recall that β˜2 was defined as the size of the set
P of probability measures compatible with the belief system in question:
We made the — arguably rather natural — proposal of measuring the
size of P in terms of the Hausdorff dimension and Hausdorff measure of
the canonical geometrical representation ι[P] of P as an intersection of
hyperplanes with the set of probability measures (on a finite set whose
power-set is isomorphic to the algebra of propositions with respect to
which beliefs are formed), which itself is the intersection of a hyperplane
with a unit cube.
Now, in the case of S, the canonical geometrical representation
ι[PS] is the intersection of the four-dimensional unit cube with
four hyperplanes, one for each of the three (conditional) probability
assignment) plus the hyperplane generated by requiring the total mass
to add up to one:
ι[PS] =
x ∈ [0, 1]4 :
x(1) + x(2) + x(3) + x(4) = 1,
x(1) =
(
x(1) + x(2)
)
α1,
x(1) + x(2) = α2,
x(1) + x(3) = α3.
 .
Herein, any x =
〈
x(1), x(2), x(3), x(4)
〉 ∈ ι[PS] represents a probability
measure on the power-set of Ω =
{
ω(1), ω(2), ω(3), ω(4)
}
that is
compatible with S and assigns probability x(i) to {ω(i)} for each
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}; the three (conditional) probability assignments that
make up S have been encoded accordingly.18 By elementary linear
algebra, this reduces to
(3) ι[PS] =


α1α2
α2 (1− α1)
α3 − α1α2
1− α2 (1− α1)− α3

 .
18For example, the assignment of a probability of α1 to the conditional event
R3|R2 requires that the probability of R2 ∩ R3 equals α1 times the probability
of R2. The former proposition corresponds to
{〈
R˙2, R˙3
〉}
=
{
ω(1)
}
, the latter
proposition to
{〈
R˙2, R˙3
〉
,
〈
R˙2, ¬˙R˙3
〉}
=
{
ω(1), ω(2)
}
. Therefore, the conditional
subjective probability assignment 〈R3|R2‖α1〉 from S corresponds to the equation
x(1) =
(
x(1) + x(2)
)
α1 in the above formula for ι[PS]. In a similar vein, the
conditional subjective probability assignment 〈R2|Ω‖α2〉 from S corresponds to the
equation x(1) + x(2) = α2 in the above formula for ι[PS], and the degree of belief
〈R3|Ω‖α3〉 corresponds to the equation x(1) + x(3) = α3.
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This is a singleton and thus its Hausdorff dimension is zero and so
is its Hausdorff measure: Therefore, according to our proposal in the
above excursion, the degree of probabilistic consistency of S must be
represented by two zeroes.
β˜2(S) = 〈0, 0〉.
This, however, does not mean that S is probabilistically inconsistent,
just that is in a sense ‘minimally consistent’ probabilistically.
Rather, PS is a singleton (since ι[PS] is a singleton) and thus in
particular non-empty, so
β2(S) = 1.
In other words, the belief system S is probabilistically consistent, and
S induces a unique probability system that is compatible with S.
For the probabilistic consistency component of BonJour’s challenge,
this is already sufficient: It shows that S cannot be dominated in terms
of probabilistic consistency simpliciter by S′. Since we have already
seen that S dominates S′ in other aspects of coherence, all we need to
show that S fares at least as well as S′ in terms of logical consistency
and probabilistic consistency. (In fact, BonJour [6, p. 95f.]introduced
the belief systems that we modelled by S and S′ as an example of two
belief systems which cannot be distinguished by logical or probabilistic
consistency, but still cannot reasonably called equally coherent.)
Nevertheless, for the sake of illustration, we shall also compute
β˜2(S
′). A similar analysis for S′ will show that ι[PS′ ] is actually given
by the following linear equation system:
ι[PS′ ] =

x ∈ [0, 1]8 :
x(1) + · · ·+ x(8) = 1,
x(1) + x(2) + x(3) + x(4) = α′1,
x(1) + x(2) =
(
x(1) + x(2) + x(5) + x(6)
)
α′1,
x(1) + x(3) =
(
x(1) + x(3) + x(5) + x(7)
)
α′1,
x(1) + x(2) + x(5) + x(6) = α′2,
x(1) + x(2) =
(
x(1) + x(2) + x(3) + x(4)
)
α′2,
x(1) + x(5) =
(
x(1) + x(3) + x(5) + x(7)
)
α′2,
x(1) + x(3) + x(5) + x(7) = α′3,
x(1) + x(3) =
(
x(1) + x(2) + x(3) + x(4)
)
α′3,
x(1) + x(5) =
(
x(1) + x(2) + x(5) + x(6)
)
α′3.

,
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which can be simplified to become19
ι[PS′ ]
=


λ
α′1α
′
2 − λ
α′1α
′
3 − λ
α′1 − α′1α′2 − α′1α′3 + λ
α′2α
′
3 − λ
α′2 − α′1α′2 − α′2α′3 + λ
α′3 − α′1α′3 − α′2α′3 + λ
(1− α′1)(1− α′2) + α′3(α′2 − 1) + α′1α′3 − λ

: λ ∈ R

∩[0, 1]8
19By elementary linear algebra, one first gets
ι[PS′ ] =

x ∈ [0, 1]8 :
x(1) + · · ·+ x(8) = 1,
x(1) + x(2) + x(3) + x(4) = α′1,
x(1) + x(2) = α′1α
′
2,
x(1) + x(3) = α′1α
′
3,
x(1) + x(2) + x(5) + x(6) = α′2,
x(1) + x(2) = α′1α
′
2,
x(1) + x(5) = α′2α
′
3,
x(1) + x(3) + x(5) + x(7) = α′3,
x(1) + x(3) = α′1α
′
3,
x(1) + x(5) = α′2α
′
3.

which after dropping repeated equations reduces to
ι[PS′ ] =

x ∈ [0, 1]8 :
x(1) + · · ·+ x(8) = 1,
x(1) + x(2) + x(3) + x(4) = α′1,
x(1) + x(2) = α′1α
′
2,
x(1) + x(3) = α′1α
′
3,
x(1) + x(2) + x(5) + x(6) = α′2,
x(1) + x(3) + x(5) + x(7) = α′3,
x(1) + x(5) = α′2α
′
3.

and finally, solving for x(1) and inserting the solutions,
ι[PS′ ] =

x ∈ [0, 1]8 :
x(2) = α′1α
′
2 − x(1),
x(3) = α′1α
′
3 − x(1),
x(4) = α′1 − α′1α′2 − α′1α′3 + x(1),
x(5) = α′2α
′
3 − x(1),
x(6) = α′2 − α′1α′2 − α′2α′3 + x(1),
x(7) = α′3 − α′1α′3 − α′2α′3 + x(1),
x(8) = 1− α′1 − α′2 + α′1α′2 + α′2α′3 − α′3 + α′1α′3 − x(1)

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In other words, ι[PS′ ] consists of all vectors of the eight-dimensional
unit cube that can be written in the form
0
α′1α
′
2
α′1α
′
3
α′1(1− α′2 − α′3)
α′2α
′
3
α′2(1− α′1 − α′3)
α′3(1− α′1 − α′2)
(1− α′1)(1− α′2) + α′3(α′2 − 1) + α′1α′3

+

1
−1
−1
1
−1
1
1
−1

λ
for some real number λ. Clearly, the Hausdorff dimension of ι[PS′ ] is
one, and its Hausdorff measure is positive.
6.5. Calculation of the first component of the coherence
measure. The first component of our coherence measure, β1, captures
logical consistency. It is obvious from our above calculations of
representations of PS and PS′ (under ι) that only the top element of the
Boolean algebra (Ω in the case of belief system S on algebra A; Ω′ in
the case of belief system S′ on algebra A′) is assigned probability 1 by
every probability measure that is compatible with the respective belief
system (be it S or S′). Therefore, η(S, {1}) = Ω and η(S′, {1}) = Ω′,
whence
β1(S) = 1 = β1(S
′).
Just as claimed by BonJour when introducing the challenge [6, p. 95f.],
S and S′ cannot be told apart by considering logical and probabilistic
consistency (i.e. β1 and β2) alone.
6.6. Summary. As we have seen,
β1(S) = β1(S
′), β2(S) = β2(S′),
β3(S) > β3(S
′), β4(S) = β4(S′).(4)
The whole point of BonJour’s [6, p. 95f.] giving the example of these
two belief systems was that they are indistinguishable in terms of logical
and probabilistic consistency, but the former is more coherent than the
latter on account of inferential connections. This is exactly what the
first three relations in the above formula array (4) teach us. Thus,
our formal coherence notion has passed the test; it does live up to
BonJour’s challenge.
So far, we have merely constructed one coherence measure for
each of BonJour’s first four desiderata. We doubt that much more
can be achieved without specifying the exact epistemic context. The
epistemic context may, however, provide additional information on
how to balance the four components of our vector-valued coherence
measure (perhaps even in a non-linear way). Taking this into account,
one can take the weighted average of the components (perhaps after
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applying a suitable monotone transformation in order to reflect any
non-linearities).
7. Discussion
7.1. Summary of this paper. In this paper, we have proposed
a formal framework for the analysis of Bayesian belief systems and,
within that framework, a formal definition for the (vector-valued)
degree of coherence of belief systems. Our definition is a formalisation
of the essential parts of BonJour’s [6] coherence concept, and it passes
the test of BonJour’s “ravens” challenge. It can be used as a point
of departure to construct single-valued coherences measures satisfying
BonJour’s desiderata, e.g. by forming a weighted average (with weights
depending on the epistemic context) of its components.
7.2. Reply to objections against vector-valued coherence
measures. There is an obvious objection to a vector-valued coherence
measure: The range of our coherence measure does not consist of
(hyper)reals, but in general of hyperfinite sequences of hyperreals. Now
there is, of course, more than one natural linear order on Cartesian
powers of the (hyper)reals. Therefore, the set of coherence values
cannot be linearly ordered in a non-arbitrary way, whence the coherence
of belief systems will generally be incomparable.
On the one hand, this may be a disappointment for coherentists who
had hoped for a single-valued coherence measure. On the other hand,
given the multi-faceted nature of coherence, it is hardly surprising that
a formal coherence notion should be a multi-dimensional concept.
In fact, there may be epistemic contexts where it is quite clear how
to order the set of coherence values — e.g. by defining a (hyper)real-
valued function, increasing in each component and of low degree of
complexity, on the set of coherence values — and thus to obtain a scalar,
single-dimensional coherence measure for that context. This does not
contradict Bovens and Hartmann [11] who showed the impossibility of
coherence rankings satisfying certain desiderata, as will be explained
below in Subsection 7.3.
One can also give the following reply: On the basis of our vector-
valued coherence measure, it is easily possible to find single-valued
coherences measures that satisfy the first four desiderata laid down
by BonJour. The reason is that those desiderata only demand
that features of a doxastic system should ceteris paribus positively
(or in some instances negatively) affect coherence. Therefore, the
composition of our vector-valued, say RN -valued, coherence measure
with any componentwise increasing function from RN to R (for
example, weighted averaging) yields a single-valued coherence measure
satisfying the first four of BonJour’s desiderata.
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7.3. Reply to objections citing impossibility theorems
about coherence measures. In response to our above thesis about
the feasibility of constructing a single-valued coherence measure from
our vector-valued coherence measure, someone might invoke well-
known impossibility theorems, as for instance the one by Bovens and
Hartmann [11]. The reason for the compatibility of our possibility
result with Bovens’ and Hartmann’s [11] impossibility result (and, for
that matter, all other impossibility results in the literature reviewed
above; they all work with a similar framework) is that the latter
operate in a very different framework from ours, even conceptionally:
(α) Their framework has, in contrast to ours, no room for partial
belief; in the framework of Bovens’ and Hartmann’s [11] paper (as
in all the existing literature on coherence measures reviewed above),
the only intermediate state between believing a proposition and
believing its negation is to have no doxastic attitude towards that
proposition at all. (β) Whosoever evaluates the coherence measure has
a unique probability measure defined on the algebra generated by all
propositions occurring in the doxastic states whose coherence is to be
measured. (γ) Doxastic states are, very much unlike in our framework,
characterized by sets of propositions to which agents take a binary
attitude. More precisely, while Bovens and Hartmann [11] conceive
of doxastic states as sets of propositions, the present paper construes
belief systems as collections of conditional probability assignments
or, equivalently, as sets of probability measures compatible with such
assignments (see Section 2). These differences imply that the domain
of a coherence ranking in the sense of Bovens and Hartmann [11] is
utterly different from the domain of our proposed graded coherence
notion.
As a result, Bovens’ and Hartmann’s [11] desideratum called
“Probabilism”, while perfectly suitable to the existing formal literature
on coherence measures, is not applicable to our framework. In
addition, Bovens’ and Hartmann’s [11] desideratum of “Holism” —
the requirement that a transitive and complete ordering be defined
on all non-empty information sets — is again very sensitive to how
information sets are conceived, and need not be upheld when a merely
local, context-specific coherence norm is sought.
7.4. Further objections. There are also, of course, potential
objections to our formalisation of (the thrust of) BonJour’s [6]
coherence notion that relate to more general philosophical positions
that the present paper subscribes to.20
20Very recently, Hájek [31] has formulated (i) a powerful challenge to a core
tenet of Bayesianism, viz. regularity, and (ii) D.W. Miller has offered a vigorous
critique of Bayesian confirmation theory on account of its use of the relevance
measure of confirmation (partly unpublished, but summarised in [54] and building
upon the joint paper by Popper and Miller [60]). These are, of course, serious
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7.5. The dialectics of weak coherentism and its
alternatives. So far, our discussion has concentrated on potential
objections to our proposal of a formal coherence concept and their
refutations. But one could also strike a less defensive note: In a
recent paper (Herzberg [38]), a weakness of stronger versions of
both foundationalism and infinitism that arises from the Principle of
Inferential Justification (cf. e.g. Fumerton [28]) in a Bayesian setting
is explored. This provides support for epistemological theories that
do not assume a linear inferential structure of reasons, but instead
adopt a holistic approach — which, of course, demands a concept of
coherence that is both (a) formally defensible and (b) may serve the
purposes of traditional epistemology. The present paper is an attempt
at defining such a concept.
Adopting a coherence theory of epistemic justification along the
lines sketched in this paper, however, does not mean that there cannot
be foundational beliefs (as for instance those that Wittgenstein had in
mind in his On certainty [74])! Our formal account explicitly allows for
belief systems that include the assignment of an unconditional degree-
of-belief of 1 to certain propositions; and such foundational beliefs in
turn may entail, with a high conditional degree-of-belief, other beliefs,
thus giving rise to a linear chain of reasons. However, unlike strong
foundationalism, we do not suppose that every justified belief will have
to belong to such a finite chain of reasons terminating in a foundational
belief. In that sense, our version of coherentism is more liberal than
strong versions of foundationalism.
7.6. Explanation and truth-conduciveness in coherentism.
Since our graded coherence notion is a formalisation of the thrust
of BonJour’s [6] coherence concept, which exhibits some concern
with explanatory relations (as the desiderata (III)–(V) reveal), it is
challenges to the overall project of a revived Bayesian coherentism, but a rebuttal
would be way beyond its scope. We shall respond to both challenges in two
forthcoming papers.
Another complaint against our graded coherence notion might be (iii) that our
proposed formalisation could assign a non-minimal degree of coherence even to belief
systems S that encode infinite regresses of probabilistic justification, provided PS is
sufficiently large. In response, we point to a recent result by Herzberg [36, 37] that
gives a criterion for the probabilistic consistency simpliciter of certain probabilistic
regresses of epistemic justification which in turn can be used to refute influential
arguments against regresses of epistemic justification.
Moreover, a critic might argue (iv) that our use of Robinsonian nonstandard
analysis should subject us to a methodological criticism, since nonstandard analysis
is allegedly fundamentally non-constructive (not just in a technical intuitionist
sense). This objection can relatively easily be countered by referring to the
metamathematical justification of nonstandard analysis (in terms of definable
nonstandard models of the reals and entire nonstandard enlargements) contained
in Kanovei and Shelah [41], Kanovei and Reeken [40], and Herzberg [34, 35].
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a suitable formal device for those coherence theories of epistemic
justification that see coherence as a token of explanatory strength. Our
coherence notion also passes the test of BonJour’s ravens example,
which can be seen as a test of the truth-conduciveness of a given
coherence notion as much as of its explanatory significance.
7.7. A synthesis of BonJourian views. Since our coherence
notion is graded it is well-suited to give a coherentist account of graded
epistemic justification. It seems that such an account is consistent
with a very narrow, Cartesian view of knowledge and full epistemic
justification, as espoused in the more recent writings of Laurence
BonJour [7] — for the simple reason that the latter position does not
pose normative constraints on partial epistemic justification.21
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